comments:
You read one book you like 42 years ago and promote it ever since, even though its core claims have been refuted. I’ve pointed out to you that it’s been refuted, but still you promote it. Axelrod’s work excels at modeling the “is”—emergent strategic equilibria among self-interested agents—but provides no normative foundation for the “ought,” failing to derive moral obligations, address one-shot dilemmas, noise, asymmetry, or deeper ethical questions of justice and unconditional virtue. As critics such as Ken Binmore have compellingly argued, its claims of robustness are overstated, rendering it an incomplete guide for real-world social or moral order. See: Review: The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration To quote: The persistence of the tit-for-tat bubble is a mystery to game theorists. Why do science writers continue to use TIT-FOR-TAT as the paradigm for human co-operation? Authors like Ridley (1996) are aware of the criticisms of Axelrod's work surveyed here. Do they not understand them? Is Tit-for-Tat the Answer? On the Conclusions Drawn from Axelrod's Tournaments The prisoners’ dilemma and game theory are great for learning about computer programming, but it’s not going to inform you about normative ethics.